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In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing
Standard-Reflections on Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Hague
Gene R. Shreve*
"I think it difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more
completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guid-
ing standards of a legal character than in trying to determine what
choice of law is required by the Constitution."1
I. INTRODUCTION
It had been eighteen years since the United States
Supreme Court reviewed a state choice-of-law case;2 hence le-
gal scholars eagerly awaited 3 the Court's recent choice-of-law
decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.4 Unfortunately, it
is a disappointment. The Hague opinions reveal that the Court
is split on issues it considers central to the controversy.5 Al-
* Visiting Associate Professor, The National Law Center, George Wash-
ington University.
The author wishes to acknowledge the research suggestions of Professors
Mary Ann Glendon of Boston College Law School and Peter Teachout of Ver-
mont Law School, and the assistance of Professors Maurice Rosenberg of Co-
lumbia Law School and Donald Trautman of Harvard Law School, who read
and made helpful comments on the manuscript. Any aspects of the article
which trouble the reader are, of course, attributable solely to the author.
1. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1945).
2. The last case in which the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of a
state court in a choice-of-law controversy-between private litigants-was Clay
v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964). Professor Brilmayer offers Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1978) as another recent choice-of-law decision. See
Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State &
Federal Law, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1315 (1981). In Hall, however, the sovereign im-
munity issue, raised by the state of Nevada, as a party, in part eclipsed and in
part distorted the choice-of-law process. For a discussion of Nevada v. Hall,
see note 137, infra.
3. See Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv.
872, 872 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Martin, Personal Jurisdiction). While the
Hague decision was pending, the case was the subject of the program of the
section on conflict of laws at the 1981 meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools.
4. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). For a different approach to examining this case
than the one found in this Article, see Brilmayer, supra note 2.
5. See notes 118-20 infra and accompanying text.
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though the particular choice-of-law result permitted by the
Court's affirmance of the Minnesota Court decision6 is disquiet-
ing,7 the Court's failure to produce a desirable or even an intel-
ligible choice-of-law reviewing standard is more troublesome.
This Article critiques the Supreme Court's failure to pro-
vide a viable conflict-of-law reviewing standard by examining
three possible methods of reviewing Minnesota's choice-of-law
decision. Under the first and most permissive approach, the
Supreme Court would have employed recently developed stan-
dards of judicial jurisdiction as a surrogate for state choice-of-
law review. Using the second and most restrictive approach,
the Supreme Court would have reviewed state cases under an
evolving federal common law of conflicts, displacing state con-
flict-of-law 8 rules. Applying the third approach, the one closest
to the Supreme Court's traditional view, the Court would have
applied a rule of constitutional scrutiny intended to provide
minimum guarantees of fairness to the parties in choice-of-law
decision making.
This Article advances the position that the third reviewing
approach is preferable to the first two, and that although the
concept of fairness is somewhat inchoate, it is possible to re-
duce it to standards which the United States Supreme Court
can administer to produce an effective and institutionally ap-
propriate review of choice-of-law decisions. The Article con-
cludes that the Court in Hague both lost an opportunity to
enunciate and apply this standard, and reached the wrong re-
sult in the case before it.
11. THE DECISION
Plaintiff Hague's husband was killed when an automobile
driven by an uninsured motorist struck the motorcycle upon
which he was a passenger. At the time of the accident, the de-
cedent had an insurance policy from defendant Allstate cover-
ing three vehicles; the coverage for each vehicle included risk
from uninsured motorists to a maximum of $15,000. Plaintiff
6. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Mim. 1978).
7. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
8. This Article will use the phrases "conflict of laws" and "choice of law"
interchangably to describe the issue created when the facts of a controversy
implicate possibly irreconcilable rules of two or more jurisdictions. Neither is
an entirely felicitous phrase, but both enjoy considerable use. On the etymol-
ogy of "conflict of laws," see Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice
of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAw & CONTFMP. PROB. 105, 105 n.2
(1977), and of "choice of law," see Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Prob-
lem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 179 (1933).
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filed suit for declaratory judgment in a Minnesota district court,
seeking a determination that Allstate's coverage limit for the
accident was $45,000. Plaintiff argued that the court should ap-
ply Minnesota insurance law, which permitted aggregation or
"stacking" of the three coverage provisions.9 Defendant All-
state's position was that the law of Wisconsin forbidding stack-
ing governed the coverage question, not Minnesota law.O
9. Brief for Petitioner at 3-5, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
Both parties agreed that if Minnesota law applied, then stacking was permitted.
289 N.W.2d at 46 n.3. The most complete narrative of the facts in Hague is con-
tained in the stipulation of the parties presented to the Minnesota Supreme
Court and, subsequently, to the United States Supreme Court.
[TIhis case ... arises out of an automobile and motorcycle acci-
dent which occurred on July 1, 1974 in Pierce County, Wisconsin, which
is immediately adjacent to the border near Red Wing, Minnesota.
Ralph A. Hague was a passenger on a motorcycle owned and operated
by his son, Ronald Hague.
The Hagues were traveling west ... and they intended to turn left
... onto a road that led to Elderwood Heights, Wisconsin. They
slowed to an eventual stop and signaled their intention to make a left
turn. While waiting for an eastbound car to pass in the oncoming or
opposite lane, the motorcycle was struck from behind by an automobile
owned and operated by Mr. Richard R. Borst, a resident of Ellsworth,
Wisconsin. Mr. Ralph A. Hague died as a result of injuries sustained in
this accident.
At the time of the accident, Ralph A. Hague resided with his wife,
Lavinia Hague, in Hager City, Wisconsin, which is located just one and
one-half ... miles from Red Wing, Minnesota. Although Ralph A.
Hague resided in Wisconsin, he was employed in Red Wing, Minnesota.
... After the accident, and prior to the initiation of the above entitled
matter, Lavinia Hague moved her residence to Red Wing, Minne-
sota.... Lavinia Hague ... [later] married... a Minnesota resident
and established residence... in Savage, Minnesota.
Ronnie Hague['s] . . .motorcycle was not insured. Mr. Richard R.
Borst was without valid insurance coverage at the time of the accident.
Ralph A. Hague was insured, at the time of the accident, by All-
state, which had issued one policy to the decedent. . ., which policy
extended coverage to three automobiles that Ralph A. Hague owned. A
separate premium was paid for each such automobile. The policy...
provided for uninsured motorist coverage to the limits of $15,000.00 for
each such automobile.
.... Subsequent to her appointment as personal representative,
Lavinia Hague initiated the above entitled action against Allstate.
The plaintiff in this action, Lavinia Hague,. . . is suing for declara-
tory relief construing the above indicated policy so as to "stack" the
separate $15,000.00 uninsured motorist coverages on each automobile
and therefore afford coverage in the total amount of $45,000.00.
Brief for Petitioner at 3-5, 449 U.S. 302.
This apparently served as the basis for the statement of facts used by Jus-
tice Brennan to open his plurality opinion. 449 U.S. at 305. Justice Stevens
surmised, or somehow determined, the additional fact that the insurance con-
tracts in question failed to contain express directives on either the stacking is-
sue or choice-of-law provisions. Id. at 328-29.
10. The Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the defendant's antistacking
view of Wisconsin law, observing that the rule might "be based in part on a de-
sire to keep insurance premiums low while providing some protections against
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The Minnesota district court granted plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, and Allstate appealed. A majority of the
Minnesota Supreme Court" held that selection of the Minne-
sota stacking rule was both constitutional12 and an appropriate
application of its recently adopted "choice-influencing consider-
ations" approach13 to choice of law.14
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota
Supreme Court decision;' 5 three Justices joined Justice Bren-
nan in a plurality opinion,16 and Justice Stevens concurred sep-
arately.' 7 All members of the Court assumed that a conflict
existed between the laws of Minnesota and Wisconsin.' 8 Five
uninsured motorists." 289 N.W.2d at 47. This is a supportable reading of the
purpose of the antistacking rule, because a Wisconsin statute permitted that
rule to operate. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 204.30(5) (West 1967); Nelson v. Employers
Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 558, 562 n.1, 217 N.W.2d 670, 672 n.1 (1974); Scherr v.
Drobac, 53 Wis. 2d 308, 310, 193 N.W.2d 14, 15 (1972); Leatherman v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 651, 190 N.W.2d 904, 907 (1971).
Section 204.30(5) of the Wisconsin statute was amended, however, by
Chapter 72, Laws of 1973. The amendment adds, under certain circumstances, a
bar to the reduction of uninsured motorist coverage below comparable levels of
insured motorist liability. In refusing to apply the amendment retroactively,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court left open the question whether it would affect
Wisconsin's antistacking rule in cases (like Hague) which arose after the effec-
tive date of the amendment. Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 558,
569, 217 N.W.2d 670, 675 (1974).
Noting this, the Minnesota Supreme Court nonetheless decided that the
amended Wisconsin law was "essentially the same", 289 N.W.2d at 48 n.8, and
concluded that "stacking would not be permitted if Wisconsin law were to ap-
ply." Id. at 48.
11. Justice Otis dissented on the grounds that the selection of the Minne-
sota rule was an undesirable choice-of-law result which violated the federal
standard of due process. 289 N.W.2d at 50-54.
12. Id. at 50 (supplemental opinion of the majority after rehearing).
13. Id. at 46-49 (original opinion of the majority).
For further discussion of the "choice-influencing considerations" approach,
see notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
14. Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
Discussion of developments in Minnesota conflict-of-laws doctrine may be
found in Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial
Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975, 1007-09 (1977); Note, The
Minnesota Supreme Court: 1979, 64 MimN. L. REV. 1181, 1187-91 (1980); Com-
ment, Conflict of Laws: Minnesota Rejects the "Significant Contacts" Doctrine
in Favor of the "Better Law" Test, 58 MIN. L. REv. 199 (1973). While doctrine
has shifted, the result-selection and application of Minnesota law-has re-
mained a characteristic of the Minnesota decisions. Sedler, supra, at 1007;
Comment, supra, at 203.
15. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302. Justice Stewart did not partici-
pate. Id. at 320.
16. Id. at 305-320. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice
Brennan. Concerning the precedential significance of Hague as a plurality de-
cision, see note 150 infra.
17. 449 U.S. at 320-32.
18. In argument before the United States Supreme Court, Hague raised
[Vol. 66:327
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVIEWING STANDARD
Justices also agreed that the selection of the Minnesota stack-
ing rule did not present the Court with a federal question, be-
cause it did not violate the due process or the full faith and
credit clauses of the United States Constitution.19 Although
the quality of the Minnesota court's choice-of-law decision
prompted criticism, 20 the Court refused to consider the case as
an opportunity to displace state conflicts law with national
choice-of-law rules.21
the possibility that no real conflict existed between Minnesota and Wisconsin
law. Brief for Respondent at 3-5, 449 U.S. 302. See note 10 supra. Dismissing
the point, Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality.
The court below rejected this contention and applied Minnesota law.
Even though the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of Minnesota law
followed a discussion of whether this case presents a false conflict, the
fact is that the court chose to apply Minnesota law. Thus the only
question before this Court is whether that choice was constitutional.
449 U.S. at 306 n.6.
Though the status of Wisconsin's law was less than clear, this Article pro-
ceeds on the assumption-consistent with all the state and federal opinions-
that Wisconsin law and policy continued to be represented by the antistacking
rule. Justice Brennan's apparent lack of interest in examining the point, how-
ever, is troublesome. The Supreme Court was not bound to accept the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's interpretation of Wisconsin law. Adam v. Saenger, 303
U.S. 59 (1938). The failure of the Supreme Court to independently satisfy itself
that a genuine conflict existed between the insurance coverage rules of Minne-
sota and Wisconsin suggests two problems.
First, whatever its content, the constitutionality of applying the Wisconsin
rule is clear. See note 50 infra and accompanying text. If the Court interpreted
both rules to permit stacking, resolution of the federal question of unconstitu-
tionality argued from application of the Minnesota rule would have been imma-
terial to the outcome, and the policy against unnecessary review of state
decisions suggested by such cases as Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207
(1935) and Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874), would
have counselled against a decision on the merits in Hague. The answer to this
criticism appears to lie in a series of Supreme Court decisions qualifying the
Murdock doctrine to permit review "[i]f the state court explicitly bases its de-
cision solely upon a determination of the federal question ... even though the
state court, consistently with the record, might have based its decision on an
adequate state ground." R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
238 (5th ed. 1978).
The second problem created by the plurality's lack of interest in examining
Wisconsin law is harder to dismiss. It is difficult to answer properly the ques-
tion the plurality assigned itself; "whether [the Minnesota Supreme Court's]
choice was constitutional," 449 U.S. at 306 n.6, without including in the inquiry a
measurement of the extent of Wisconsin's interest in the controversy. See
notes 133-49 infra and accompanying text.
19. See 449 U.S. at 320; id. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, dissent-
ing, were unable to find an interest which would justify Minnesota's application
of its stacking law. They argued that the choice violated the due process and
full faith and credit clauses. Id. at 332-40.
20. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
21. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
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III. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO REVIEW IN HAGUE
A. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AS A SURROGATE FOR STATE CHOICE-
OF-LAW REVIEW
The relationship between a court's assertion of judicial ju-
risdiction 22 and choice of law is a subject which has attracted
considerable interest.23 The Supreme Court has stated fre-
quently that constitutional reviewing standards for the two are
separate. 24
There are signs in Hague, however, that the Court may be-
come more indulgent in its choice-of-law review, because
stricter standards for judicial jurisdiction2s will eliminate cases
which otherwise may produce unconstitutional choice-of-law
results. In commenting on Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,26 a
22. I adopt Professor Resse's definition of judicial jurisdiction. He defines
the phrase as 'the power of a state to try a case in its courts." Reese, Legisla-
tive Jurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1587 (1978). See 1 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 79, at 100 (1971) (hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND)); Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Con-
tacts: World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341
(1980).
23. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L.
REv. 185, 201-03 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Martin, Constitutional Limita-
tions); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L REV. 33,
82-88 (1978); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1128-32 (1966). See generally Martin, Personal
Jurisdiction, supra note 3.
24. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, the plurality opinion presented
three prior decisions which noted that the failure of the state court under re-
view to possess judicial jurisdiction did not necessarily imply that application
of that state's governing law would also have been unconstitutional. 449 U.S. at
330 n.23. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254, n.27 (1958). To this
list may be added World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294
(1980).
Other signs in the Hague plurality opinion, however, suggest a softening of
this distinction. See text accompanying notes 27, 30 infra.
25. See World-Wide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
For commentary examining these cases and their possible significance, see
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Juris-
diction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77; Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme
Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19 (1980); Martin, Personal
Jurisdiction, supra note 23; Silberman, supra note 23; Comment, supra note 22.
26. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). (Dick, a Texan, acquired an interest in a vessel in
Mexican waters. He received an assignment of a fire insurance policy covering
the vessel in Mexican waters. The policy, originally issued by a Mexican insur-
ance company to a Mexican resident, stipulated that suit for the collection of a
claim must be filed within one year from the date of loss. Dick brought suit on
the policy in a Texas court more than one year after the alleged loss. Jurisdic-
tion was obtained by garnishing two American insurance companies who
[Vol. 66:327
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case in which the Supreme Court held that the Texas state
court's application of its law, unsupported by a Texas connec-
tion with the controversy, violated due process, the Hague plu-
rality observed: "There would be no jurisdiction in the Texas
Courts [sic] to entertain such a lawsuit today."27 The plurality
cited Rush v. Savchuk28 and Shaffer v. Heitner29 for this propo-
sition and later added: "Here, of course, jurisdiction in the
Minnesota courts is unquestioned, a factor not without signifi-
cance in assessing the constitutionality of Minnesota's choice
of its own substantive law."3 0 The plurality also noted, "the de-
cision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's laws and
rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness of per-
mitting that same State to accept jurisdiction for adjudicating
the controversy"3 1 and that "both inquiries 'are often closely re-
lated and to a substantial degree depend upon similar consider-
ations.'"32 Although only the plurality held this view of the
relationship between jurisdictional and choice-of-law reviewing
doctrines, 33 this movement toward their consolidation gives
cause for concern.
The plurality is correct in suggesting that tightened stan-
dards for judicial jurisdiction will deprive some courts of the
opportunity to reach questionable choice-of-law results. One
can note additional troublesome, perhaps unconstitutional,
choice-of-law decisions which could not recur after Rush. In
both O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.34 and Rosenthal v. War-
pleaded the one year contractual limitation as a defense. The United States
Supreme Court held that Texas had insufficient contact with the controversy to
make Texas law applicable.)
27. 449 U.S. at 325 n.12.
28. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Rush invalidated as a violation of due process the attempt by Minnesota
courts to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction through the attachment of an insur-
ance company's contractual obligation to its insured. The best known case em-
ploying this technique was Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). For a discussion of the Seider doctrine and its abolition by
Rush, see Kamp, supra note 25, at 25-29.
Texas state court jurisdiction in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick was obtained
through in rem garnishment of the reinsurance obligations of two New York in-
surers. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 402 (1930). The Hague plurality is
correct in suggesting such jurisdiction is impossible after Rush v. Savchuk.
29. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
30. 449 U.S. at 330 n.23.
31. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
32. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 224-25 (1977) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
33. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens appears to resist softening the dis-
tinction between the two reviewing doctrines. Id. at 320-21 n.3.
34. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
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ren,35 the Second Circuit permitted a New York plaintiff the
benefit of New York tort law although virtually all other con-
tacts were in defendant's home state. The choice-of-law results
in both cases have been strongly criticized.36 Because jurisdic-
tion in both cases was premised on attachment of insurance ob-
ligations, neither can recur in light of Rush v. Savchuk.37
In two other cases the Supreme Court averted a constitu-
tional confrontation over choice of law when it invalidated as-
sertions of judicial jurisdiction. In Hanson v. Denckla,38 the
Florida Supreme Court evaded Delaware trust law and applied
its own. The result was so contrary to settled choice of law in
trusts that it attracted wide criticism, 39 including suggestions of
unconstitutionality.40 It was not necessary, however, for the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue, because it concluded that
the Florida courts lacked jurisdiction in the case.41 In Rush it-
self, the majority assumed that the Minnesota court would fol-
low Minnesota's law permitting automobile passengers to
recover against their drivers.42 This would have posed constitu-
tional difficulties, because the case arose from an automobile
accident in Indiana involving two Indiana residents, and the In-
diana guest statute would have prevented recovery.43 The
Court's ruling on jurisdiction again precluded the need to reach
the conflict-of-law issue.44
The Court did not question the jurisdiction of the Minne-
sota forum over Allstate.45 Nor do the facts suggest that All-
state could have raised an effective challenge under current
35. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
36. Regarding Rosenthal, see Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CoRNELL L. REV. 94, 135-36 (1976); Mar-
tin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 23, at 225-27; Reese, supra note 22, at
1605-06. Regarding O'Connor, see Rosenberg, A Comment on Neumeier, 34 Am.
L. REV. 231, 240 (1980); Silberman, supra note 23, at 101.
37. Both O'Connor and Rosenthal relied on New York's Seider doctrine.
Concerning the effect of Rush on Seider, see Kamp, supra note 25, at 25-29.
38. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
39. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 36, at 146 n.201; von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 23, at 1174-75.
40. Kirgis, supra note 36, at 144-46.
41. For a general discussion of the case, see Scott, Hanson v. Denckla, 72
HAnv. L. REV. 695 (1959).
42. 444 U.S. at 325 n.8. The majority's prediction would probably have been
borne out. See note 14 supra.
43. 444 U.S. at 322. See generally notes 134-35 infra and accompanying text.
44. See note 28 supra.
45. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. Jurisdiction was conceded
by the dissenting justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, 289 N.W.2d at 50
(Otis, J., dissenting) and by Allstate, Brief for Petitioner at 6, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
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jurisdictional doctrine. Allstate did a substantial amount of
business in Minnesota, 46 and there was nothing to suggest that
Allstate would undergo hardship or great inconvenience if
forced to defend in Minnesota instead of the neighboring state
of Wisconsin where the accident occurred.47
Exploration of considerations of relative fairness and con-
venience to the defendant in plaintiff's selection of a Minnesota
forum is central to a contemporary inquiry concerning judicial
jurisdiction.48 The same inquiry provides little insight, how-
46. "According to the Minnesota Insurance Division, Allstate in 1978 col-
lected 4.74% of all private passenger vehicle premiums. Allstate is the fourth
largest automobile insurer in Minnesota." Brief for Respondent at 6, 449 U.S.
302.
The multistate character of the business activity of insurance companies
suggests that there may be many instances where the presence of the defend-
ant insurer may be sufficient to support judicial jurisdiction, yet be insuffi-
ciently related to the controversy to support application of the forum rule as
governing law. Cf. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)
(Plaintiff sued in Georgia state court on a life insurance policy naming her as
beneficiary. The policy was on her husband's life. The couple purchased the
policy when they resided in New York, and plaintiff's husband died there prior
to her move to Georgia. The decedent made misrepresentations in obtaining
the policy, which would have made it unenforceable under New York law. The
Georgia courts, however, applied forum law, which permitted the insurer's obli-
gation to be enforced. The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court,
Justice Brandeis stated: "In respect to the accrual of the right asserted under
the contract, or liability denied, there was no occurrence, nothing done, to
which the law of Georgia could apply. Compare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397, 406." Id. at 182.)
47. When judicial jurisdiction is questioned, it seems sensible to measure
relative inconvenience between forcing the defendant to defend in the forum
selected by the plaintiff and permitting the defendant to defend in the least
convenient of other forums which would clearly have jurisdiction over the case.
One would expect the adjacent forum of Wisconsin to have been as inconve-
nient for the defendant as Minnesota. The power of Wisconsin to have imposed
judicial jurisdiction in the case cannot be doubted, since both contract and tort
dimensions of Hague's controversy with Allstate were centered in Wisconsin.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) supra note 22, at §§ 35-36; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at
1144-53.
Moreover, because of its policies issued and in force in Minnesota, Allstate
probably had standing arrangements to defend suits brought there, and hence
the inconvenience of defending the Hague case in Minnesota was not as great
as it would have been if Minnesota were an unfamiliar forum. This point was
noted by the Hague plurality, though in an inappropriate context. See note 111
infra and accompanying text.
48. Professors von Mehren and Trautman described "the relation of the
parties litigant to the forum and litigational and enforcement considerations
(for example, convenience of witnesses and feasibility of local enforcement)"
as "basic to all thinking about jurisdiction to adjudicate ... ." von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 23, at 1128.
Following the "minimum contacts" approach of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), the Court in World-Wide Volkswagon v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) observed.
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ever, into the propriety of the selection of Minnesota law to de-
termine the rights and duties of the parties.49 The Minnesota
courts in Hague favored their own insurance law over what
they assumed to be conflicting insurance law of Wisconsin,
even though Wisconsin was the site of the accident, the resi-
dence of all parties to the accident, the residence of the plaintiff
at the time of the accident, the place where all related vehicles
were garaged and licensed, the place where the parties entered
into the insurance contract, and the place where premiums
were paid and the policy retained.50 This is a disturbing choice-
of-law result, one aptly described by Justice Stevens in his con-
The concept of minimum contacts... can be seen to perform two re-
lated, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts
to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond
the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system.
Id. at 291-92.
There is little material in the first function for purposive development of
rules to control choice-of-law abuses. See note 49 infra. Similarly, the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court have left the meaning of the second function some-
thing of a cipher. Comment, .supra note 22, at 1345, 1352-53. The search for
possible meanings of "federalism" in the context of "minimum contacts" has
recently become active. Kamp, supra note 25, at 22-24; Reese, supra note 22, at
1591-94; Comment, supra note 22, at 1344-45.
The most plausible exegesis of "federalism" in this context is suggested in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Within the federal system, the authority of
judgments of a sister state was greater than those from the courts of foreign
nations because of article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution, the
full faith and credit clause. But even that authority would under certain cir-
cumstances be open to question because of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
The two provisions of the United States Constitution which are illuminated
in striking the balance of the 'minimum contacts" test of judicial jurisdiction
are the same two most frequently employed in the constitutional review of
choice-of-law decisions. See notes 101-06 infra and accompanying text. This
may create confusion. It seems to me, however, that they are employed differ-
ently in each setting. To the extent that notions of 'federalism" require a
broader concept of judicial jurisdiction than can be accommodated solely by
notions of fairness and convenience to the defendant in plaintiff's selection of a
forum, completion of the concept requires embracing the function of the full
faith and credit clause in the recognition and enforcement of judgments, a func-
tion distinctly different from use of the clause in choice-of-law review. See note
105 infra and accompanying text.
49. "[I]dealy, the choice-of-law question--the relationship between the
underlying controversy and the forum-should be of little significance for the
jurisdictional problem." von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 23, at 1128-29. See
Silberman, supra note 23, at 82-83.
While it is true that the desire to apply an unfairly parochial substantive
rule might provide incentive for the assertion of judicial jurisdiction without
"minimum contacts," it is preferable to be vigilant in administering the doc-
trine as it is, rather than larding it with new, choice-of-law dimensions. But see
Martin, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 3.
50. See note 9 supra. See also 289 N.W.2d at 51 (Otis, J., dissenting).
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curring opinion as "plainly unsound as a matter of normal con-
flicts law."51
Although the doctrine of judicial jurisdiction may operate
to preclude occasions of aberrant or excessively parochial state
choice of law, there is a need for the Supreme Court to review
state conflicts decisions. Hague and other court decisions52
demonstrate that the reach of the doctrine of judicial jurisdic-
tion is insufficient to recommend it as an adequate surrogate
for Supreme Court review of state choice-of-law decisions, and
that it cannot be considered an adequate substitute for control
of choice-of-law abuses through purposive doctrine.
B. NATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW AS A BASIS FOR STATE CHOICE-
OF-LAw REVIEw
Commentators have advocated the creation of national
choice-of-law rules.5 3 Unfettered choice-of-law decision mak-
51. 449 U.S. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring). For other criticisms of Hague,
see Martin, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 883; Note, supra note ;4, at
1191.
52. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (applica-
tion of Oregon law to frustrate the recovery of a California plaintiff defrauded
as the result of a contract solicited in California. The result is unsatisfactory
and of questionable constitutionality.). See also Reese, supra note 22, at 1607.
The facts of Lilienthal suggest that the application of Oregon law subjected the
California plaintiff to unfair surprise. See note 109 infra and accompanying
text. At the same time, the defendant's residence in Oregon provided judicial
jurisdiction. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 23, at 1137.
It may be that this situation will arise less frequently than the one sug-
gested by Hague and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178
(1936). See note 46 supra. Plaintiff would typically look for a more hospitable
forum than the one selected in Lilienthal. In many cases, if the substantive
law favored by plaintiff can constitutionally be applied, he or she need only file
suit in that law's home state. In her excellent article on jurisdiction, Professor
Silberman suggested that "if a court has the power to apply its own law, it
should have the power to exercise jurisdiction over the action." Silberman,
supra note 23, at 88 (emphasis in original). The roots of constitutionally valid
choice-of-law and judicial jurisdiction may be too dissimilar, however, to read-
fly permit the assumption that satisfaction of the first invariably subsumes
questions concerning the second. As a separate matter, it is at least arguable
that a forum's power to impose judicial jurisdiction must be legislatively au-
thorized before it becomes effective. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84,
98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214 (1977); cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U.S. 13 (1928) (Court struck down as a violation of due process a state statute
providing that state residents could serve process on the Secretary of State as
the agent of non-resident motor vehicle drivers on state highways, where there
was no provision making it reasonably probable that the non-resident defend-
ant would receive notice of service). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 221
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law: A Sug-
gested Approach, 14 U.C.L.A L. REV. 119 (1967); Stimson, Simplifying the Con-
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ing54 may arguably produce results that impinge on federal in-
terests.55 Judges can create federal common law to protect and
to advance these interests.5 6 Although Congress would un-
doubtedly have the authority to enact choice-of-law rules, it is
ill-suited to the task.57 Conflicts law would more easily evolve
as federal common law.58
The Hague court, however, expressly declined the opportu-
nity to create national conflicts law. Justice Brennan began his
analysis in the plurality opinion by disavowing an intent either
to question the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of a con-
flicts methodology,59 or to indicate "whether we would make
the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the Minnesota
Supreme Court."60 Justice Stevens in his concurrence stated
the Court's position even more directly: "It is not this Court's
function to establish and impose upon state courts a federal
choice-of-law rule ... "61
In many respects, the case for initiating a federal common
law of conflicts in Hague was attractive. Over the past twenty
years local bias in choice of law has become a growing con-
cern.62 National choice-of-law rules could reverse that trend.
flict of Laws: A Bill Proposed for Enactment by the Congress, 36 A.B.A. J. 1003
(1950); Trautman, supra note 8.
54. See note 62 infra.
55. Underpinnings of federal concern which provide the authority for the
creation of national choice of law include the full faith and credit clause and
the fourteenth amendment. Trautman, supra note 8, at 114 n.36. But see A.
EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 29 (1962). Regarding other
sources of authority, see Horowitz, supra note 53, at 1195 (the Commerce
Clause); id. at 1204-05 (the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976));
Trautman, supra note 8, at 114 n.36 and Horowitz, supra note 53, at 1201 (fed-
eral questions arising from interstate disputes). To the list could be added the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
56. See Trautman, supra note 8, at 114.
57. "[S]ince codification of choice-of-law rules runs in the teeth of the cur-
rent trend in choice of law and is ill-adapted to the needs of a federal system, a
choice-of-law code does not offer an appealing solution." Cavers, The Changing
Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CoNTEmra'. PROB. 706,
752 (1963).
58. Horowitz, supra note 53, at 1194; Trautman, supra note 8, at 114. But
see Stimson, supra note 53.
59. 449 U.S. at 307.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 332.
62. "[C]ourts frequently appear all too eager to use contemporary choice-
of-law analysis to justify local regulation of multistate disputes despite insub-
stantial local relationships." Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basis
of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice of Law Theory: The Signifi-
cance of Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L REV. 1063-64
(1979). See also Sedler, supra note 14, at 995 n.87; von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CoRNEm .. L REV. 927, 944-46 (1975). For case ex-
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National choice of law would produce the additional benefit of
freeing federal diversity courts from the difficult problem of de-
termining and applying local conflict-of-law rules. 63
amples in addition to Hague, see Alexander, supra, at 1064 n.5; notes 34-35
supra and accompanying text. But, for examples of principled forum self-de-
nial, see Trautman, supra note 8, at 108, n.11.
63. Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
During the period between the Supreme Court decisions in Erie v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and Klaxon, there was uncertainty whether
choice-of-law rules for federal courts sitting in diversity were still permissible
or whether they were part of the general common law invalidated by Erie.
Klaxon determined them to be the latter and, hence, impermissible. Federal
diversity courts were instructed to apply the choice-of-law rules of the states
where they sat.
The range of critical response to Klaxon has run from disapproval, Baxter,
Choice of Law and Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 41 (1963); Weintraub,
The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict-of-Laws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228 (1964), to
approval, AL, STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 376 n.7 (1969).
Klaxon did not naturally follow from Erie. Erie stopped the intrusion of
federal general common law on expressions of local policy reflected in state
rules of liability, an intrusion typified in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). The pull of fed-
eral interest in such cases was weak. On the other hand, the federal interests
in ameliorating the effects of parochial choice of law are far easier to grasp. See
note 55 supra. It seems inappropriate, if not untoward, for federal diversity
judges to be as chauvinistic in championing local state law as their state court
counterparts.
Additional analytic problems have taxed federal courts in administering
the Klaxon rule. First, ascertaining state law when the same "is confused or
nonexistent" is a perennial problem under Erie. Clark, State Law in the Fed-
eral Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267,
290 (1946). See, e.g., Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st
Cir. 1957). Nowhere is the problem greater than in ascertaining state conflicts
law under Klaxon. This is due in part to the inherent difficulty of conflicts doc-
trine, see note 94 infra and accompanying text, and in part to the inconsistency
of state choice of law brought about by local bias. For instance, New York state
decisions have favored home state litigants: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d
121, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972); home state law: Kell v. Henderson,
26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966); or both: Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569,
249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d
877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). Second, administration of the Klaxon rule has
posed perplexing federal venue problems. It is now settled that the state
choice-of-law rule of the transferor forum is generally to be applied. VanDusen
v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). The troublesome question remains whether
VanDusen should be followed in transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) when
plaintiff's case clearly would have been dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds if he had filed in the state court of the transferor forum. To follow Van
Dusen in such a case would appear to give plaintiff unfair leverage in shopping
for favorable conflicts law. Yet, this was the result in In re Air Crash Disaster
at Boston, Mass., 399 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Mass. 1975).
Despite the problems posed by Klaxon, the Supreme Court recently reiter-
ated the rule in Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), and federal
diversity judges generally seem unabashed by the character of state conflicts
law they are called upon to apply. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying
text. If conflicts law became federal common law, all choice-of-law doctrine
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The facts of Hague also made it a good vehicle for the in-
troduction of national common law. The harshness of the case
would have illuminated and reinforced the Court's lawmaking
justification. The relative simplicity of the case would have per-
mitted the Court to postpone refining or elaborating on its new
conflicts doctrine until closer and, hence, more difficult cases
appeared.64
Had the Supreme Court been willing to take the step advo-
cated by the national choice-of-law argument, both the result in
Hague and the decisional method used to reach it would have
changed. A sound choice-of-law result5 would have replaced
the "plainly unsound"66 result reached by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, and the ratio decidendi in the opinion explain-
ing the reversal would have comprised the initial phase of an
evolving federal common law of conflicts. The constitutional di-
mension of the Supreme Court's review would have eventually
shifted in focus from due process and full faith and credit 67 to
the paramount authority of federal common law under the
supremacy clause.6 8
When the nature and implications of the option are ex-
amined further, however, the Hague court seems correct in de-
clining to make federal conflicts law. Approaches to choice-of-
law decision making are not infinite in number and, should the
Supreme Court supervise69 the creation of a body of national
would become as federal in character as choice of law now is in federal cases
where federal questions are adjudicated, United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189
(2d Cir. 1965), and Klaxon would not be so much as overruled as superceded.
64. See IL HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 156-57 (10th ed. 1958); E. LEvi, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LEGAL REASONING 4, 8-9 (1948). For an interesting discussion of growth
and change of choice of law through the judicial process, see Powers, Formal-
isn and Nonformalism in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27
(1976).
65. A sound choice-of-law result would have been the Supreme Court's se-
lection of Wisconsin law. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 101-06 infra and accompanying text.
68. U.S. CONST. art. VL See A. EBRENZWEIG, supra note 55, at 29; Baxter,
supra note 63, at 42.
On the relationship between supremacy clause doctrine and more familiar
concepts of unconstitutionality, see P. BATOR, P. MISreIN, D. SHaRmo & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 970 (2d ed. 1973).
69. Ideally, a good deal of the formulation of national choice of law would
be undertaken by state and federal courts while the Supreme Court would use
its jurisdiction to rectify off-course movements and create essential elements of
the methodology. On the contemporary significance of Supreme Court lawmak-
ing, see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & AL ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-39
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conflicts law, the result would probably resemble one of the
four choice-of-law methodologies now generally in use:7 0 the
late Professor Currie's government interest analysis,7 1 Profes-
sor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations,7 2 the First Re-
statement,73 or the Second Restatement. 74 Discussion
concerning the meanings of these methodologies and their mer-
its and demerits7 5 in application have produced a vast amount
of commentary. It is important for the purposes of this Article,
however, to assess how each methodology would work as a ve-
hicle of national choice of law and, ultimately, whether any of
them could produce satisfactory results. That makes it neces-
sary to determine whether each methodology tolerates forum
favoritism or tries to impose neutrality.
Both the government interest and choice-influencing con-
(1976); Betten, Institutional Reform in the Federal Appellate Courts, 52 IND. L.J.
63, 68 (1976).
70. For a state by state survey of choice-of-law methodologies in use, see
Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 316 n.2 (Tex. 1979). In addition, see R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 305-06 n.47 (2d ed. 1971).
Prior writings on federal intervention in the choice-of-law process seem to
suggest that one could stop short of the creation of an entire choice-of-law
methodology, Baxter, supra note 63, or, at least, that the evolving methodology
need not closely resemble one of the four now in general use. Horowitz, supra
note 53; Trautman, supra note 8. These assumptions about how state and lower
federal courts could be guided no longer seem realistic. Case developments
formed the four methodologies into irresistible frames of judicial reference.
71. For contemporary descriptions of this methodology, see Cavers, Con-
temporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, III RECUEIL DES CouPs 75,
146-49 (1970); Sedler, The Government Interest Approach to Choice of Law An
Analysis and Reformation, 25 U.CL.A. L. REV. 181 (1977).
72. See R. LEFLAR, AmErucAN CoNmICTs LAw 205-19 (3d ed. 1977); Leflar,
Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267
(1966) (hereinafter cited as Leflar, Choice-Influencing).
73. RESTATEMENT OF CoNFucT LAws (1934). The original Restatement was
largely a reflection of the conflicts thinking of Professor Joseph Beale. Beale's
approach is discussed in von Mehren, supra note 62, at 929-30, 94345.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 22. On the approach of the RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND), see Cavers, supra note 71, at 143-44, 222-23; Reese, Con-
flict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoN'EaMu. PROB. 679 (1963);
note 89 infra.
75. Each methodology has had its detractors. A representative list of criti-
cism of the four methodologies includes the following- Government interest:
Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 McH. L.
REV. 392 (1980); Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.LA. L. REV.
551 (1968); Choice-Influencing Considerations: W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG,
CASES AND MATERmAs ON CONFLICT OF LAws 473-74 (7th ed. 1978); Trautman,
Rule or Reason in Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. REV. 1, 14
(1976); First Restatement. W. CooK, THE LOGIcAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1942); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933); Second Restatement: Ehrenzweig, The Second Con-
flicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230
(1965); Sedler, supra note 14.
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siderations methodologies lack an overriding assurance of neu-
trality in choice-of-law results. In its early form, the
government interest approach appeared to require the applica-
tion of forum law whenever "the court finds that the forum
state has interest in the application of its policy."76 Professor
Currie's later writings suggest a more subdued endorsement of
local law,7 7 but not the desideratum of neutrality. In contrast,
Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations7 8 provide
material for principles of forbearance in the application of local
law when the court is satisfied that fairness, multistate policies,
or the mere pressing interest of another state calls for a differ-
ent result.7 9 The problem is that the Leflar methodology is plu-
ralistic enough to also include the parochial concern of the
government interest analysis,80 and so loose-textured that it
can easily be manipulated to produce the same results as a
government interest approach.81
76. B. CuiuE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 184 (1963).
Professor Currie rejected the argument that this approach might be unsatisfac-
tory even if it was determined that the interests of a second state were more
affected. He wrote that "a court is in no position to 'weigh' the competing inter-
ests, or evaluate relative merits, and choose between them accordingly." Id. at
181.
77. See, e.g., Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEIP.
PROB. 754, 763 (1963). See also Professor Cavers' formulation of Currie's later
methodology in Cavers, supra note 71, at 146-47.
78. The considerations include:
A. Predictability of results;
B. Maintenance of interstate and international order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task;
D. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
E. Application of the better rule of law.
Leflar, Choice-Influencing, supra note 72, at 267.
79. See Rosenberg, Symposium. Conflict of Laws Round Table: The Value
of Principled Preferences, 49 TEx. L. REV. 211, 231 (1971); von Mehren, supra
note 62, at 952.
80. Forum interests are promoted chiefly through Professor Leflar's final
two considerations, "government interest" and the "better rule of law."
81. Professor Leflar offered many hypothetical examples to illustrate appli-
cations of his considerations. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing, supra note 72, at
311-24 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions, 54 CAT. L. REV. 1584, 1588-98 (1966). But he does not appear to advocate
that his considerations be given equal weight by judges or that particular con-
siderations always be applied. He seems willing to trust the application of this
methodology to the considerable discretion it creates for the judges who use it.
See R. LEFLA, supra note 72, at 218. Professor Leflar's methodology has be-
come popular with courts. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 75, at
473. Generally, the results of its application favor the forum state to the same
extent as does Professor Currie's test. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494
F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979);
Schwartz v. Consolidated Preightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 223 N.W.2d 470, cert
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408
(1973); Haines v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970).
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The administration of the government interest and choice-
influencing considerations tests do not foreclose forum bias.
Since the first test exalts parochialism and the second tolerates
it, both are inconsistent with the justification for national
choice of law82 and are unsuitable common law models for the
Supreme Court. National common law based upon either ap-
proach would be a contradiction in terms.83
The formalistic "vested rights" approach of the First Re-
statement,8 4 though ostensibly neutral,85 has been thoroughly
discredited.86 The Second Restatement,87 the policy-centered
yet neutral8 8 methodology that succeeded it, is likely to provide
the best model of the four for national choice of law. Yet be-
cause the structure of the Second Restatement is both intricate
and elastic, 89 it is amenable to result-oriented judicial
82. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
83. Supreme Court tolerance for the interested forum's advancement of its
laws suggests the reason why the Supreme Court declined to make national
choice of law in Hague. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 308-9 n.11. See
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-22 (1978); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,
15 (1962); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,
547-48 (1935).
84. See note 73 supra.
85. Efforts to avoid the policy-blind rigors of the First Restatement and to
reach and apply forum law led to the conceptualization of a number of escape
doctrines. This eroded the actual neutrality of the First Restatement. See R.
CRAmToN, D. CuRarE & H. KAY, CONFUCT OF LAws: CAsEs-CoMmErNTs-QuEs-
TIONS 69-76, 138-43 (2d ed. 1975); Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Sub-
stance?, 49 COLuM. L. REv. 1027, 1056-62 (1949); Paulson & Sovern, "Public
Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. IL REV. 969, 970-71 (1956).
86. W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 75, at 664, Powers, supra note
64, at 27, 37-38; Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan A Time to Go Modern, 24
WAYNE L. REv. 829, 830-36; von Mehren, supra note 62, at 945.
87. See note 74 supra.
88. "[T]he Restatement is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum
which has no interest of its own to protect and is seeking only to apply the
most appropriate law." Reese, supra note 74, at 692.
89. Section 6 of the Second Restatement contains a constellation of choice-
of-law policy considerations ("principles") which is longer than, but (except for
omission of the "better rule" test) not unlike, Leflar's list of choice-influencing
considerations. See note 78 supra. The user is instructed to determine which
state's law has the most "significant relationship" to the case. Factual charac-
teristics most likely to be significant to the inquiry are identified as "contacts"
to be evaluated. "Contacts" vary according to the substantive nature of the
lawsuit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 22, at § 145 (torts), § 188 (con-
tracts). Choice-of-law presumptions are made in narrower substantive con-
texts, subject to the possibility that another state may have a more "significant
relationship." Id. § 175 (wrongful death-presumptive choice is of "the local
law of the state where the injury occurred .... ").
While retaining the First Restatement's outward appearance of providing
an extensive regime of rules, the Second Restatement differs sharply by em-
phasizing party fairness and an instrumental sensitivity to the substantive poli-
cies behind rules vying for selection. Consequently, "[a] comparison [of the
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manipulation.90
Actual instances of unprincipled manipulation of the Sec-
ond Restatement undoubtedly would have been greater if
courts had not felt free to abandon it in favor of methodologies
giving legitimating recognition to forum bias.91 If the Supreme
Court imposed a neutral, policy-centered choice-of-law method-
ology like the Second Restatement, it would face the dilemma
of either undertaking a debilitating amount of superintendence
through judicial review of state decisions 92 or presiding over
only the illusion of neutrality in the choice-of-law process.
Instances of Supreme Court creation of federal common
law have been episodic and undisciplined. 93 It becomes rele-
vant, therefore, to question whether the cure of federal com-
mon law administered in this most difficult of doctrinal areas 94
would not be worse than the disease of unprincipled state
First Restatement with the Second Restatement] at almost any point will illus-
trate the shift away from the rule orientation of the former toward the rather
general, often amorphous 'principles' of the latter." Holland, Modernizing Res
Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615, 619 n.14 (1980).
90. Much of the approach of the Second Restatement depends upon the
term "significant relationship." See note 89 supra. The term suffers from the
lack of a clear meaning. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 55, at 361-62; Juenger,
Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 202, 212-13 (1969). Profes-
sor von Mehren faults the Second Restatement generally for its failure to "sig-
nificantly refine and discipline theory and analysis." von Mehren, supra note
62, at 964.
91. Compare Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463
(1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)
with Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969);
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968). Compare
Bolgrean v. Stich, 293 Minn. 8, 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972) with Milkovich v. Saari, 295
Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
92. As it is, "[t]he Supreme Court is no longer capable of providing the su-
pervision of federal judicial lawmaking that it once provided." Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Re-
view and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 553 (1969). Federal courts of
appeals consequently developed "the ability to create and to balkanize national
law." Betten, supra note 69, at 68. See Shreve, Questioning Intervention of
Right-Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 894,
922 n.116 (1980).
93. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Jackson, supra note 1, at 1. But see Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383
(1964).
The Supreme Court recently expressed reservations about adopting an ex-
pansive view of federal law. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981);
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 101 S. Ct.
2615 (1981).
94. Commentators have called conflicts the "most difficult and most con-
fused of all branches of the law," Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrft, 11
Am. J. CoMP. L. 632, 655 (1962); "the most elusive and difficult branch of private
international law," von Mehren, supra note 62, at 928; and "one of the most baf-
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choice-of-law decisions. The potential number of truly bad
state choice-of-law decisions may not be sufficiently great9 5 that
the benefits from their rectification would justify the convulsive
effects that a federal common law of conflicts would produce on
conflicts doctrine and judicial-administration.
Moreover, some degree of state court parochialism in
choice of law may be defensible and even desirable. Justice
Stevens correctly observed in Hague that the law with which
the state judge is familiar, and the only law which the judge's
time and library resources may permit him or her to compre-
hend, is the law of the forum.96 The state judges' experience in
adjudicating the purely domestic cases which compose the vast
majority of most judicial caseloads forms the basis of their rela-
tionship with the forum law.9 7 A state judge's initial presump-
tion of the applicability of forum law in every case may be less
an act of chauvinism than an understandable and perhaps inev-
itable institutional reflex.
It is desirable for foreign law carrying a superior claim for
application to displace presumptive forum law. In extreme
cases, displacement should be constitutionally required.9 8 But
a valid local policy of judicial administration may support the
initial presumption of the applicability of forum law.99 To the
extent that national choice of law would invalidate that pre-
sumption, it might exceed the appropriate limitations of federal
common law.10o
C. CoNsTrrUTIoNAL DoCTRMIE AS A BASIS FOR STATE CHOICE-
OF-LAW REvIEw
None of the portions of the United States Constitution sug-
gested as possibly governing state choice of law provides clear
fling subjects of legal science," B. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
67 (1928), quoted in Jackson, supra note 1, at 2.
95. It is questionable whether the number of greatly troublesome conflicts
results is large when compared to all conflicts cases decided. See Reese, supra
note 22, at 1594 n.37. Tightened judicial jurisdiction doctrine will decrease the
number even more. See notes 27-44 supra and accompanying text.
96. 449 U.S. at 326 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Resor-Hill Corp. v.
Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 524, 249 S.W.2d 994, 996 (1952) ("In our library we have
the statutes and decisions of every other State and it seldom takes more than a
few hours to find the answer to a particular question.").
97. See B. CumuE, supra note 76, at 82; von Mehren, supra note 62, at 942.
98. See notes 133-49 infra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
100. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLuM. L. REV. 489 (1954).
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direction.'10 It appears sensible to confine constitutional
source material to the due process 02 and full faith and credit103
clauses as all the Hague opinions do.104 It is not profitable to
make fine distinctions between the respective reaches of the
two clauses, because in the context of choice-of-law review, 05
both function in similar ways. 06
101. For surveys of textual portions of the Constitution which courts have
considered with reference to the choice-of-law problem, see Martin, Constitu-
tional Limitations, supra note 23, at 145-46; Note, Unconstitutional Discrimina-
tion in Choice of Law, 77 CoLum. L. REv. 272, 273 (1977).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
103. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
104 449 U.S. at 304.
"[T]he only provisions successfully invoked with any regularity are the
due process and full faith and credit clauses." Martin, Constitutional Limita-
tions, supra note 23, at 186. See also Simson, State Autonomy in Choice of Law:
A Suggested Approach, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 61 (1978).
It is the position of this Article that the due process and full faith and
credit clauses provide the best material for formulating constitutional stan-
dards of choice-of-law review. For suggestions to the contrary, see Kirgis,
supra note 36, at 95 n.3; Note, supra note 101.
105. The full faith and credit clause produces unique and far more stringent
constitutional reviewing doctrine when the question is, instead, whether to rec-
ognize and enforce a sister-state judgment. The clause generally places states
under a compulsion to honor sister-state judgments, Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935), subject only to the possible avenues of collateral
attack permitted by due process. See note 48 supra. On extensions of the doc-
trine to govern relations between state and federal courts, see L. TREBE, AMERI-
CAN CoNsTrrTmoNAL LAw, 226 n.5 (1978).
Professor Paul Freund offered the following reasons for the different effects
of the full faith and credit clause in the choice-of-law and judgment enforce-
ment contexts:
Partly the difference lies in the opportunity theretofore given for re-
versing the judgment on direct review and the policy of putting an end
to litigation .... Partly the difference may be due to the relatively
more settled doctrines of merger, bar and res judicata, as compared
with the overlapping reach of statutes in a mobile society. Partly the
difference is traceable ... to the different treatment accorded judg-
ments and statutes in a mobile society. Partly the difference is tracea-
ble ... to different treatment accorded judgments and statutes in the
acts of Congress carrying out the Full Faith and Credit Clause ....
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 1210,
1225 (1946).
106. "When the question is limited to choice of law in cases not yet reduced
to judgment, . . . the only apparent significant distinction between the two
clauses is that due process may require adherence to the law of another coun-
try, whereas full faith and credit is limited to interstate applications." Martin,
Constitutional Limitations, supra note 23, at 186. Absent that distinction
it makes no practical difference whether the decision is based upon the
failure to give full faith and credit to the law of the only state that
could constitutionally apply its law or upon the inability of the forum
state under due process to apply its own law in determining the case.
Reese, supra note 22, at 1589. In addition, see Cavers, supra note 71, at 110.
At the same time, an apparently intractable disagreement exists over
which of the two clauses is best capable of accommodating a theory of conflicts
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Attempts by the Supreme Court to develop from the due
process and full faith and credit clauses an extensive frame-
work of rules for choice-of-law review would verge on the crea-
tion of national choice of law.l07 It is important, therefore, to
confine the adoption of reviewing standards to a very few. 08
The Hague opinions provide evidence of two choice-of-law
reviewing standards. The first is that the choice-of-law result
should satisfy notions of predictibility. More precisely, the law
chosen should not cause unfair surprise'0 9 to the litigant disad-
vantaged by it. The suggestion in the Hague dissent"O that the
Court should have permitted the Minnesota Supreme Court to
apply its law only if it were legitimately interested in the case
represents a partial formation of a second standard. It is the
position of this Article that this second standard, with greater
development, should have served as a basis for reversal of the
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision.
1. Unreasonable Surprise
None of the Hague opinions indicate that Allstate would
suffer unfair surprise if Minnesota law were applied in the case.
Justice Brennan argued for the plurality that Allstate did busi-
ness in Minnesota and, therefore, had notice of Minnesota law,
including its choice-of-law rule."1 ' This analysis confuses All-
state's susceptibility to Minnesota's judicial jurisdiction with
the appropriateness of Minnesota's choice-of-law result.112 Jus-
review. Compare Reese, supra note 22; Kirgis, supra note 36 (advocating due
process) with Martin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 23; Martin, A Re-
ply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CoRmNLL L. REv. 151 (1976) (advocating full faith and
credit). To a large degree, the debate is over precedent and it seems unprofita-
ble to extend it here, particularly since constitutional precedent on conflicts is
clouded and insufficiently complete to provide a final answer for the situation
presented in Hague. See note 124 infra. See generally notes 133-49 infra and
accompanying text.
107. A precise line between the two would be difficult to draw. See Traut-
man, supra note 8, at 114 n.37.
108. The constitutional latitude thus afforded the states by virtue of
their respective interests is not, of course, necessarily the measure of
what may be desirable as a choice of law by either state, any more than
the point at which a state may constitutionally curb picketing is neces-
sarily the soundest limit on picketing as a matter of labor law.
Freund, supra note 105, at 1223.
109. The term and concept are taken from Weintraub, Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449,
457-60 (1959) (hereinafter cited as Weintraub, Limitations). See also R. WEiN-
TRAUB, supra note 70, at 271-72.
110. 449 U.S. at 334 (Powell, J., dissenting).
111. 449 U.S. at 317-18.
112. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
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tice Stevens believed that the application of Minnesota law
would not upset Allstate's reasonable expectations, since it
failed to include either a choice-of-law provision or an anti-
stacking provision in the decedent's policy.113 This analysis
seems to place an onerous burden of anticipation on Allstate.114
Although a better argument for unfair surprise in Hague
may exist,115 none of the Supreme Court opinions recognized
one, and the extent to which foreseeability inquiry could have
led to reversal to establish it is uncertain.116 The case then
raises the issue whether the Court might administer a second
constitutional standard, one not grounded on concerns of fore-
seeability, to overturn Hague.li7
2. Demonstrable State Interest
The dissenters in Hague agreed "that no reasonable expec-
tations of the parties were frustrated.""18 Yet they would have
reversed the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision, because
they were unable to conclude that "application of Minnesota's
substantive law reasonably furthers a legitimate state
interest.""19
In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that "the
Minnesota contacts with the parties and the occurrence are ob-
viously significant."' 20 The three "contacts" offered in the opin-
ion were that: (1) the decedent commuted to work in
Minnesota for fifteen years prior to his death, (2) Allstate was
licensed and doing business in Minnesota, and (3) plaintiff be-
came a Minnesota resident after her husband's death and com-
menced probate proceedings in Minnesota.'21 The opinion
argued that these contacts affected the choice-of-law question
113. 449 U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., concurring).
114. Nevertheless, Professor Weintraub surveyed insurance industry prac-
tices, and concluded that "to talk of 'surprising' the insurer is very likely to be
talking nonsense." R. WE IrrAuB, supra note 70, at 272-73. See also Morris, En-
terprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE LJ. 554 (1961); Comment, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol: A Wis.
consin Study, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 495. But see John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936), summarized in note 46 supra; Weintraub, Limita-
tions, supra note 109, at 457-58 (suggesting an element of unfair surprise to the
insurer in Yates from the application of forum law).
115. See 289 N.W.2d at 54 (Otis, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 14, at 1190-
91(1980).
116. See notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
117. See note 135 infra and accompanying text.
118. 449 U.S. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 311.
121. Id. at 313-19.
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presented to the Minnesota courts and that they brought the
case under Supreme Court precedents upholding the forum's
choice of its law.122 The dissent correctly rejected the pur-
ported contacts as "either trivial or irrelevant to the furthering
of any public policy of Minnesota,"123 and correctly found the
plurality's attempt to fit the facts of Hague under existing pre-
cedent as unpersuasive.124
122. Id. at 307-19. The seven cases advanced by the plurality are reviewed
at note 124 infra.
123. Id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting). An argument can be made that Min-
nesota has an interest in applying its rule permitting greater compensation for
plaintiffs domiciled in Minnesota at the time of suit. "It is not apparent why
the degree of a state's interest in the welfare of a domiciliary should necessar-
ily depend upon the length of time that he has been domiciled there." Reese,
supra note 22, at 1603.
Yet, if one wishes to impute an interest to Minnesota in this sense, then it
arose too late to be fairly counted in the choice-of-law inquiry. Id. To put the
matter another way, the plaintiff in Hague should not have the power to change
the substantive character of the suit through acts unilaterally taken after the
cause of action arose. See Note, supra note 14, at 1190-91; Address by Prof.
Linda Silberman, Meeting of Conflict of Laws Section, Conference of Associa-
tion of American Law Schools (Jan. 4, 1981).
124. 449 U.S. 332-40 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent actually distin-
guished only three of the plurality's cases: Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330
U.S. 469 (1947); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939); and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532 (1935). The other four cases advanced by the plurality, Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410 (1979); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); and Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. 348
U.S. 66 (1954), are distinguishable, however, on the same basis.
It is helpful to read past precedent supporting application of forum law by
identifying a "clear critical event within the state whose law is being applied
.... " Martin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 23, at 201. All of the plu-
rality's seven precedents involve such an event: Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410
(1979) (tort-injury in forum state); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179
(1964) (insurance coverage--casualty loss in the forum state); Carroll v. Lanza,
349 U.S. 408 (1955) (tort-injury in forum state); Watson v. Employers Liab. As-
surance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (direct action against insurer-injury in forum
state); Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947) (death recovery-
employer and decedent domiciled in the District of Columbia, site of the fo-
rum); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939) (worker's compensation-injury in forum state); and Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (worker's compensa-
tion-employment contract made in forum state). In contrast, it is not possible
to place a "clear critical event" in the Hague case within Minnesota. See note
123 supra and accompanying text.
It is easy to conclude that the dissenters had the better argument concern-
ing precedent. Hague is far closer to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930),
see notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text, and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936), see note 46 supra, than it is to the cases ad-
vanced by the plurality.
It is questionable, however, whether the matter should be left there.
Supreme Court reviewing doctrine is unsettled. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 224 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Jackson,
supra note 1, at 1. Even if it were otherwise, the pull of stare decisis should not
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The approach to affirmance taken by Justice Stevens in his
concurrence, however, is more difficult to dismiss. Justice Ste-
vens, also troubled by the plurality's contacts analysis, disasso-
ciated himself from it125 and posed a different challenge to the
dissent:126 if state courts were entitled to an initial presump-
tion that selection of their own law is constitutional,127 then
only a showing of tangible harm from selection of forum law
could overcome that presumption. Justice Stevens found no
tangible harm in the selection of the Minnesota stacking rule,
observing that the choice neither created "unfairness to either
litigant"' 28 nor posed "any threat to national unity or Wiscon-
sin's sovereignty ... .-"129 He concluded that the defendants
had not overcome the presumption of validity which Minnesota
courts should enjoy in the selection of their own law. Although
he expressed disapproval of the choice-of-law approach in
Hague, he was not prepared to declare it unconstitutional.130
Justice Stevens may have overcome the arguments actually
offered by the dissent, but the result he reached was unsatis-
factory. Adverse effects from the selection of the Minnesota
stacking rule may have been less palpable than the ones Jus-
tice Stevens searched for under existing doctrine 13 ' and was
unable to find; yet, they should have provided sufficient132 justi-
fication to declare the state court decisions in Hague unconsti-
tutional. The situation presented in Hague required new
doctrine.
IV. TOwARD RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IN HAGUE
The standard of foreseeability, or avoidance of unfair sur-
prise, has proven the most durable for constitutional review of
be as great, because reviewing doctrine is a constitutional matter. See Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627, n.2 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); E. LEVI,
AK INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-8 (1948); Frankfurter, supra note 93, at
537 (1947). In a search for the most enlightened and institutionally appropriate
standards for Supreme Court review, opportunities created by current prece-
dent might be too confining.
125. 449 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. For the rationale supporting the initial presumption, see notes 96-97
supra and accompanying text.
128. 449 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 324 (Stevens, J., concurring).
130. "Although I regard the Minnesota court's decision to apply forum law
as unsound as a matter of conflicts law, and there is little in the record other
than the presumption in favor of the forum's own law to support that decision, I
concur in the plurality's judgment." Id. at 331-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. See notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text.
132. See note 141 infra.
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conflicts decisions.133 This standard explains, in part, the cases
upon which Allstate principally relied. 34 If one were willing to
assume that Minnesota's choice of its stacking law did not sub-
ject Allstate to unfair surprise, then the Court could have re-
versed the decision only if it were willing to evaluate the result
with reference to a second constitutional standard. This Article
suggests that the subsequent standard is that, at least in cases
in which the application of the conflicting law of another, inter-
ested state is an option, a state may constitutionally apply its
law only in situations in which the state has a policy which it
has some demonstrable interest in advancing. Interest, as used
in this Article with reference to the forum or another jurisdic-
tion, is determined by the extent to which the controversy
tends to implicate the function or purpose of the substantive
rule under consideration.135
If values of interstate or international order formed the en-
tire basis for this second standard, it would differ from the pre-
dictability standard, which is based on considerations of party
fairness. The second standard would then have little applica-
bility to Hague. The force of Wisconsin's continuing interest in
the antistacking rule is open to greater question than any of the
Supreme Court opinions in Hague disclose.136 It seems clear
that if Wisconsin were not merely interested, but extremely in-
terested in the case,13 7 the Court would have decided Hague
133. See Rheinstein, Book Review, 32 U. CHL L, REV. 369, 372 (1965) (review-
ing A. EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962)); note 109 supra and
accompanying text.
134. The petitioner relied principally on John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Delta Pine and
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). Brief
for Petitioner at 7-9, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
Professor Weintraub found the possibility of unfair surprise in all three
cases, Weintraub, Limitations, supra note 109, at 457-60. He later questioned
that conclusion with reference to Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. See R. WEm-
TRAUB, supra note 70, at 502-03. But see Kirgis, supra note 36, at 108 n.53. Jus-
tice Stevens found all three cases understandable in terms of foreseeability.
449 U.S. at 327 n.16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. Cf. Alexander, supra note 62, at 1069 ("Functional choice-of-law analy-
sis premises the existence of a state's 'interest' upon a finding that the state's
rule functionally is relevant to the immediate circumstances of the case. In de-
termining whether a state is legitimately interested, then, the court must iden-
tify the functions of the rule whose application is advocated)').
136. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
137. Wisconsin's interest could be contrasted with the extreme interest of
the State of Nevada in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). The interest of the
State of Nevada in the application of Nevada law was great. The University of
Nevada and the State of Nevada were defendants in an automobile tort case
fied in California. Under Nevada law, sovereign immunity for such suits was
waived only up to $25,000 and then only in Nevada courts. Following, in es-
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differently. Given the actual situation, the result in Hague ap-
pears to impinge less on the sovereign interests of the State of
Wisconsin than on the petitioner, Allstate.
The second norm nonetheless applies to Hague, because it
is also justifiable in terms of party fairness, with only secon-
dary importance attributed to the interests of Wisconsin.138 It
is a function of the judicial process to attach retrospective and
authoritative significance to the behavior of the litigants. It is
fair to subject a party to legal detriment-for example, to sub-
ject a defendant to liability for his or her past behavior--only if
the law creating that detriment reflects some demonstrable in-
terest of the state from which the law is drawn. This should, at
the minimum, be true in cases in which application of the law
of another state would remove or reduce the detriment and
that state has a demonstrable interest in having its law
applied.'3 9
Cases violating this standard may also suffer from the flaw
of unfair surprise. Application of the second standard, how-
ever, entails more than retracing ground covered by a predict-
ability inquiry. An analysis of Hague indicates that the results
of a predictability test can be uncertain.140 The Court should
not always require constitutional challengers to become so well
aware of the choice-of-law consequences of their behavior that
they experience "unfair surprise" from a subsequent judicial
decision. It should have been sufficient in Hague that because
Minnesota had no genuine interest in the controversy, it could
not fairly interpose Minnesota law to deprive Allstate of the
sence, the law of the forum, the California courts permitted a recovery of
$1,150,000. If California's interest in the case had been as minimal as Minne-
sota's interest in Hague, the vindication of the sovereign interests of Nevada
would have required reversal. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. Cal-
ifornia's interests were actually much greater, however, since the plaintiffs re-
sided there from the time of the accident, and since the accident occurred in
California. Regarding Nevada v. Hall, see generally Note, Sovereign Immunity
in Sister-State Courts: Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law Solu-
tions, 80 CoLurm. L. REV. 1493 (1980).
138. There can be cases, of course, where the sovereign interests of other
jurisdictions have greater importance. See Reese, supra note 22, at 1601-05;
note 137 supra and accompanying text. Hague, however, is not an appropriate
vehicle for the elaboration of doctrine to guide and explain the regulation of
these cases.
139. In cases where, arguably, neither the forum state nor any other juris-
diction appears interested in the controversy, room should be left for forums to
apply their own law. See notes 96, 97, 123, 130 supra and accompanying text
(discussion of Justice Stevens's presumptive validity analysis).
140. See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
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benefit of the law of an interested state, Wisconsin.141
A limited constitutional right to the application of a partic-
ular law, founded upon party fairness without regard to fore-
seeability, approximates the rights of the parties in an entirely
intrastate setting. If all material events in Hague occurred in
Wisconsin, Allstate would not have had to prove reliance or
foreseeability to obtain the benefit of the Wisconsin rule. This
is because the case would have fallen within the rational com-
pass of the Wisconsin rule and none other. Insofar as that rule
established a relative advantage for insurers, it would operate
as an entitlement for Allstate. Returning to the actual events in
Hague, Allstate's entitlement should not have automatically
ended because suit was brought in Minnesota and some colora-
ble argument was made that Minnesota also had an interest in
the case. It is unfair to separate Allstate from its entitlement
unless Minnesota can establish such an interest.
This concept of party entitlement may suggest a resurrec-
tion of the discredited theory of legislative jurisdiction and the
related concept of "vested rights."142 Atavistic return to vested
rights is unnecessary, however. A party entitlement would not
"vest" for all time. A court would honor it only if the law which
created it remained that of an interested jurisdiction, and only
if it were not displaced by the law of an interested forum.
Some cases will satisfy the second constitutional standard
of demonstrable forum state interest, yet fail to satisfy the first
standard of avoiding unfair surprise. An example is Blarney v.
Brown,143 another recent Minnesota Supreme Court choice-of-
law decision in which a Minnesota plaintiff sued the former
proprietor of a Wisconsin tavern for injuries she suffered in a
Minnesota automobile accident. Plaintiff alleged that the driver
of the car in which she was a guest drove from a point in Min-
nesota to the Wisconsin tavern, purchased a quantity of beer,
and wrecked the car after returning to Minnesota. In addition,
plaintiff alleged that the driver's consumption of the purchased
beer caused the accident and that, under the statutory and
141. This formulation answers the challenge posed by Justice Stevens in
Hague, see notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text, by overcoming the bare
presumption of the validity of forum law.
142. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MuLTI-STATE
PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 179-80 (1965);
Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement- A Last Appeal for its With-
drawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230, 1234 (1965).
143. 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070. Interestingly,
certiorari was denied in Blarney on the same day it was granted in Hague: Feb-
ruary 19, 1980.
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common law of Minnesota, the defendant was liable for plain-
tiffs injuries.
The Blarney court found the statute applicable only to Min-
nesota tavern keepers, but held that a cause of action existed
against the defendant under Minnesota common law. To reach
this result, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the common
law of Wisconsin, which would not have permitted recovery.' 44
Although the town in which the tavern was located was near
the Minnesota-Wisconsin state line, it was a neighborhood bar,
and it had never attempted to attract Minnesota patrons.145
Minnesota's genuine interest in compensating its residents,
particularly when injuries occur within the state, clearly sup-
port its application of the Minnesota rule of liability. At the
same time, however, the result appears to subject the defend-
ant to unfair surprise in violation of the first standard.
The two standards of constitutional review discussed in
this Article really do not present ends in themselves. Rather,
they combine to provide a constitutional floor of party fairness
in conflicts decision making1 46 The somewhat inchoate charac-
ter of the ideal of fairness, 47 and the threshhold difficulty of
conflicts doctrine,48 at the same time, suggest that constitu-
tional review of choice of law is a somewhat uncertain under-
taking. It is nonetheless possible to develop standards of
constitutional review to rectify unprincipled cases and to influ-
ence principled decisions in many others. In addition, states
could be left largely free to develop their own conflicts law.149
144. The court attempted to justify this result through application of Profes-
sor Leflar's "Choice-Influencing Considerations," adopted in Milkovich v. Saari,
295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973). 270 N.W.2d at 890.
145. Id. at 886. The Blarney court acknowledged that the defendant failed to
procure liquor liability insurance since he assumed that only the laws of Wis-
consin created his liability. 'These laws impose no liability upon him in the
present case and thus if Minnesota law is applied some injustice will result to
the defendant since the legal ramifications of his actions were not predictable
to him at the time he acted." Id. at 891.
146. "[T]he primary policy, indeed the very raison d'etre of conflicts law, is
the policy of mitigating for individuals the inconveniences and problems that
can arise through the actual or potential conflict of differing states' norms of ju-
dicial decision." Rheinstein, supra note 133, at 375.
147. In his thoughtful article on conflicts review, Professor Kirgis writes:
' The truly difficult task is defining the fairness standard. One must explain the
leading cases and supply a normative test that is both useful in deciding most
or all future cases and consistent with widely shared American values." Kirgis,
supra note 36, at 106.
148. See note 94 supra.
149. See Freund, supra note 105, at 1223.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Hague case and others suggest the need to impose re-
straints on excessively parochial and, hence, unprincipled
choice-of-law decision making. Jurisdictional doctrine is a poor
surrogate for choice-of-law review, because some decisions
which need rectification will not receive it, for lack of a pur-
poseful reviewing doctrine. The common law creation of fed-
eral choice of law would supply reviewing doctrine, but only
with serious threats to federalism and judicial administration.
A middle ground, a more tenable basis for choice-of-law re-
view, existed in Hague. The inability of the Court to pursue it
is the chief failing of the case. The Court should have found
that Minnesota's decision exceeded minimum constitutional
standards of party fairness. It should have ruled that, because
Minnesota had no genuine interest in the controversy, it could
not fairly interpose Minnesota law to deprive Allstate of the
benefit of the law of an interested state, Wisconsin.
The failure of a majority of the Hague Court to reach agree-
ment on the conflicts-of-law reviewing standard 50 invites the
hope of further Supreme Court deliberations and the develop-
ment of more intelligible and enlightened conflicts reviewing
doctrine in future cases. Meanwhile, the Hague decision serves
as an interesting if somewhat disturbing stimulus for
discussion.
150. Without the vote of Justice Stevens for affirnance, the court would
have been evenly divided. Had this happened, the court would have affirmed
the Minnesota decision without written opinion, "thus depriving the affirmance
of any value as precedent." R. STERN & E. GRESSmAN, supra note 18, at 2. Jus-
tice Stevens's refusal to follow Justice Brennan, see note 125 supra and accom-
panying text, deprived the Brennan opinion of majority status and weakened it
considerably. "It is hardly necessary to state that only a majority can speak for
the Court or determine what is the 'central meaning' of any judgment of the
Court." Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 n.1 (1978) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
On the growing phenomenon of Supreme Court plurality decisions, see Da-
vis & Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court,
1974 DUKE L.J. 59; Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94
HARv. L. REV. 1127 (1981).

